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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 When Elizabeth Warren, United States Senator for 
Massachusetts, ran into Gavin Newsom, the Lieutenant Governor of 
California, on her way to discuss the Dignity for Incarcerated 
Women Act,1 his response was representative of the majority of 
reactions she gets when she mentions the bill: “What? They do 
that?”2 The Dignity Act, a bill that was introduced in Congress on 
July 11, 2017, “would make a series of common-sense reforms to 
                                               
1 S. 1524, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/1524/text. 
2  C.J. Ciaramella, Bill Introduced in Congress to Ban Shackling and Solitary 
Confinement of Pregnant Women, REASON.COM: HIT & RUN (July 11, 2017, 
5:30 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/07/11/bill-introduced-in-congress-to-
ban-shack. 
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how the federal system treats incarcerated women.”3 One such 
reform includes a ban on the use of restraints on pregnant inmates.4 
Although at first blush it may seem like an archaic practice, the 
shackling of pregnant inmates, even during labor, continues to be a 
problem in the United States.  
 Despite adverse rulings by several courts, the practice of 
shackling pregnant inmates persists, forcing women who were 
pregnant and subjected to the use of restraints to litigate the issue in 
hopes of restoring their dignity and attaining compensation for 
lingering injuries caused by shackling.5 As established by the courts, 
shackling pregnant inmates constitutes a condition of confinement 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.6 Several states have been proactive in enacting 
anti-shackling legislation,7 and a bill has recently been introduced 
in Congress which would ban the practice in federal prisons.8 
However, despite adverse court rulings and a few state statutes, the 
practice persists in those places that do not have legislation in place 
to protect these women’s rights.9 For this reason, it is necessary that 
both the federal government and state governments enact legislation 
banning the practice, so that this human rights violation might be 
eradicated, and so that the United States might be worthy of its 
reputation as the land of the free. 
 This Note will demonstrate the detrimental effects of 
shackling a pregnant woman and will examine some of the efforts 
currently being made to prohibit the practice, as well as provide 
some suggestions for prohibitory legislation. Part II of this Note will 
discuss the background of this pervasive issue, both how it has been 
viewed by the courts and the ways in which it has been dealt with 
                                               
3 Senators Booker, Warren, Durbin, Harris Introduce Landmark Bill to Reform 
the Way Women Are Treated Behind Bars, ELIZABETH WARREN: U.S. SENATOR 
FOR MASS. (July 11, 2017), https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_ 
release&id=1727.  
4 Id. 
5 See Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013); 
Nelson v. Corr. Med. Sers, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009); Brawley v. 
Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Women Prisoners of the 
D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, et al., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 
1994). 
6 See cases cited supra note 5. 
7 AZ, CA, CO, DE, D.C., FL, HI, ID, IL, LA, ME, MD, MA, MN, NV, NM, 
NY, PA, RI, TX, VT, WA, WV. 2017 ACOG State Legislation Tally, Am. 
Cong. of Obstetrics and Gynecology, https://www.acog.org/-/media/ 
Departments/State-Legislative-
Activities/2017ShacklingTally.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20171029T2052480513. 
8 S. 1524, 115th Cong. (2017), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/1524/text. 
9 Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., No. 2:14-cv-00200 (E.D. Wis. 2014) 
(occurring in a state which, even in 2017, has not enacted anti-shackling 
legislation). 
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by state legislatures that have enacted anti-shackling laws. Part III 
of this Note will analyze the positions of those who support a ban 
on the use of restraints on pregnant inmates and detainees. Part III 
will also address Martin v. County of Milwaukee, a case tried in July 
of 2017 which concerns issues central to this Note. Part IV will 
demonstrate the necessity of anti-shackling legislation and present 
suggestions for legislators to consider when enacting a statute of this 
kind. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Case Law 
 
 There are four major cases addressing shackling of pregnant 
women: Women Prisoners of the D.C. Department of Corrections v. 
District of Columbia, et al.10; Nelson v. Correctional Medical 
Services11; Brawley v. Washington12; and Villegas v. Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville.13 These cases are important in 
understanding how this issue has progressed through the courts and 
in establishing a base knowledge of existing precedent, which holds 
that shackling is a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and is thus a violation of basic 
human rights. 
 In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiffs 
are required to meet a relatively high bar. The courts have held that 
in order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and 
unusual punishment, an inmate must satisfy a two-part test involving 
both an objective prong and a subjective prong.14 The first prong, 
the objective analysis, asks “whether shackling pregnant detainees 
in the manner and under the circumstances in which Plaintiff was 
shackled creates a substantial risk of serious harm that society 
chooses not to tolerate.”15 In other words, “the shackling of pregnant 
detainees while in labor [must] offend[] contemporary standards of 
human decency such that the practice violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and wanton infliction of 
pain’…”16 The courts recognize that prison is not intended to be 
“comfortable,” so “only those deprivations denying the minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form 
                                               
10 See Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of Columbia, et 
al., 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994). 
11 Nelson v. Corr.l Med. Servs, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). 
12 Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
13 Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). 
14 Id. at 571.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 574. 
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the basis” of a Plaintiff’s claim.17 As to what exactly constitutes a 
contemporary standard of decency, the courts will look to expert 
opinion, “but such information does not define the ‘constitutional 
minima’ and ‘cannot weigh as heavily in determining contemporary 
standards of decency as the public attitude toward a given 
sanction.’”18 
 The second prong, or the subjective portion of the analysis, 
asks “whether the officers had knowledge of the substantial risk, 
recognized the serious harm that such a risk could cause, and, 
nonetheless, disregarded it.”19 Thus, the plaintiff asserting an Eighth 
Amendment claim for shackling during pregnancy must establish 
“that prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate 
health or safety.”20 There are several ways an inmate might prove 
deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials. For example, 
a plaintiff may introduce “circumstantial evidence” which could 
allow a jury to find that “a prison official knew of a substantial risk 
from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”21 In addition, a 
plaintiff may demonstrate that “the risk was ‘longstanding, 
pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials 
in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official 
being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and 
thus “must have known” about it.”22 Although it is possible for a 
prison official to claim ignorance, he or she “may not refuse to 
investigate facts or inferences that he strongly suspects indicate the 
existence of a condition which violates the Eighth Amendment.”23 
 
i. Women Prisoners 
 
 Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. District of 
Columbia, which was certified as a class action in December of 
1993, was brought by and representative of “all women prisoners 
who are incarcerated in the District of Columbia correctional system 
as of October 1, 1993, and all women prisoners who will hereafter 
be incarcerated in the D.C. correctional system.”24 The class alleged 
many different forms of abuse against the D.C. correctional system, 
including shackling pregnant inmates during pregnancy, labor, and 
postpartum recovery.25 One such inmate, identified as Jane Doe L, 
was forced to give birth in her jail cell after jail officials refused to 
                                               
17 Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.Supp. at 663. 
18 Id. at 664. 
19 Villegas, 709 F.3d at 575. 
20 Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.Supp. at 664. 
21 Id. at 664. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24  See Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 877 F.Supp. at 638-39. 
25  Id. at 646-47. 
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transport her to the hospital, despite the fact that her contractions 
were a mere five minutes apart.26 Almost immediately after she 
delivered her baby, “guards placed her in handcuffs and leg shackles 
and sent her by ambulance” to the hospital.27 
 In examining the case, the court found additional evidence 
of the use of restraints on pregnant inmates.28 For example, “[a] 
physician’s assistant stated that even when a woman is in labor ‘their 
ankles and their hands are cuffed.’”29 It was also common practice 
to restrain pregnant inmates by means of “leg shackles, handcuffs 
and a belly chain with a box that connects the handcuffs and the 
belly chain” while transporting them to medical appointments.30 
 Presented with these facts, the court found that shackling 
pregnant inmates while in labor and during postpartum recovery was 
inhumane, and thus a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth 
Amendment.31  In particular, the court held that these practices 
“violate[d] contemporary standards of decency.”32 However, the 
court did limit its finding by stating that instances in which a woman 
had a history of escape or assault may qualify as acceptable reasons 
for shackling.33 In addition, the court only took issue with shackling 
during labor and immediately following.34 It found no problem in 
utilizing leg shackles during the third trimester of pregnancy, but did 
state that “the physical limitations of pregnancy and the pain 
involved in delivery make complete shackling redundant and 
unacceptable in light of the risk of injury to a woman and baby.”35 
 
ii. Nelson 
 
 Shawanna Nelson had, to say the least, a harrowing 
experience as a woman who was pregnant when arrested and 
delivered her child while incarcerated.36 When the time came to 
deliver her child, Nelson was shackled during transport to the 
hospital, her legs were shackled to the wheelchair upon arrival, and 
both of her ankles were shackled to her hospital bed.37 By the time 
she was given a hospital bed, Nelson’s cervix was dilated to 7 
centimeters, meaning she was in the final stages of labor when her 
                                               
26 Id. at 646. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 668-69. 
32 Id. at 668. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 2009). 
37 Id. at 525.  
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ankles were shackled to both sides of her hospital bed.38 Each time 
a nurse came to measure her cervix, her shackles were removed and 
then replaced as soon as the nurse had finished.39 Nelson was forced 
to endure all of this despite the fact that she “did not present a flight 
risk or any other security concern.”40 In fact, “[the Officer’s] own 
testimony indicate[d] that she was aware that shackling a woman in 
labor was hazardous and contrary to medical needs.”41 Nelson’s 
shackles were finally removed just before she was taken to the 
delivery room, but only at the doctor’s request.42 Nelson alleged that 
being shackled before, during, and after labor caused severe 
repercussions, including: extreme mental anguish and pain, 
permanent hip injury, torn stomach muscles, an umbilical hernia 
requiring surgical repair, damage to her sciatic nerve, injured and 
deformed hips, inability to sleep or bear weight on her left side or 
sit or stand for extended periods, and inability to have more 
children.43  
 Interestingly, the Arkansas Department of Corrections had 
policies in place which should have suggested to the officers that 
shackling Nelson was inappropriate.44  For instance, 
“Administrative Regulation 403 … stated the ADC policy that 
shackles were to be used ‘only when circumstances require the 
protection of inmates, staff, or other individuals from potential harm 
or to deter the possibility of escape.’”45 In addition, “any officer 
responsible for transporting an inmate to a hospital [was required] 
to ‘use good judgment in balancing security concerns with the 
wishes of treatment staff and the medical needs of the inmate’ before 
shackling an inmate during a hospital stay.”46 Yet, despite these 
policies, the officers shackled Nelson, and, as a consequence, she 
sustained serious permanent injuries.47 
 In reviewing Nelson’s case, the court first examined whether 
the officer who shackled Nelson had acted with deliberate 
indifference.48 The court found that the Officer should have been 
aware of the risk of harm to Nelson and her unborn child.49 This, 
coupled with the Officer’s own testimony that she would not shackle 
a pregnant woman due to the possibility of adverse health 
                                               
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 526. 
40 Id. at 534 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 526. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 527. 
45 Id. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 526. 
48 Id. at 528. 
49 Id. at 529-531. 
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consequences, was central to the court’s determination that the 
Officer had acted with deliberate indifference.50 
 Next, the court considered whether the constitutional right 
which Nelson asserted was established at the time the event at issue 
took place.51 Not only did the court find that Nelson’s right to be 
free from restraints during pregnancy, labor, and delivery had been 
clearly established by lower courts, it also found that it had been 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court of the United States.52 In 
making this determination, the court considered several cases, 
including Women Prisoners.53 The court reasoned that because the 
federal district court’s decision regarding the use of restraints on 
pregnant inmates in Women Prisoners had not been appealed by the 
government, a constitutional violation in such a case had been 
clearly established.54 Accordingly, with both the deliberate 
indifference element and the clearly established right element of the 
offense satisfied, the court held that Nelson’s Eighth Amendment 
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment had been 
breached.55 
 
iii. Brawley 
 
 In 2006, Casandra Brawley was incarcerated in the 
Washington State Corrections Center for Women.56 At the time, she 
was five months pregnant.57 Each and every time Brawley was taken 
to a prenatal medical appointment, “she was placed in full 
restraints,” which included “a metal chain around her waist [with] 
her hands […] handcuffed together, and the handcuffs were attached 
to the waist chain.”58 Although the Officer who transported Brawley 
to the hospital when she went into labor admitted she did not 
consider her a security risk, Brawley was placed in handcuffs and a 
waist chain, with the two restraints attached.59 When Brawley was 
given a hospital room, the chain and handcuffs were taken off, but 
the officers chained one of her ankles to her hospital bed.60 When 
she was moved to a delivery room, Brawley’s ankles were chained 
to her wheelchair.61 She was unchained and then re-chained after her 
                                               
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 531. 
52 Id. at 533. 
53 Id. at 532-533. 
54 Id. at 533. 
55 Id. at 534. 
56 Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1211 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
57 Id. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 1212. 
60 Id. at 1213. 
61 Id. 
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epidural, and her restraints were finally removed just prior to her 
emergency cesarean operation.62 After her surgery, her ankle was 
again chained to the bed.63 Even when Brawley was taken to the 
NICU to see her newborn child, she was chained to her wheelchair.64 
Perhaps one of the most troubling portions of Brawley’s 
experience occurred when her newborn son was in a bed in her 
hospital room and began to make choking or vomiting noises.65 Had 
she been free, Brawley could have quickly gotten up from her bed 
and administered the help the infant clearly needed. 66 But since 
Brawley was chained to her bed, her only option was to call for help 
and trust a nurse would arrive in time.67 
 The court found that Brawley had indeed been forced to 
“endure[] unnecessary pain, was exposed to a sufficiently serious 
risk of harm, and had a serious medical need when she was shackled 
to the hospital bed….”68 Further, the court held that “Common 
sense, and the DOC’s own policy, tell us that it is not good practice 
to shackle women to a hospital bed while they are in labor.”69 In 
other words, it should have been common sense not to shackle a 
pregnant woman in labor. Thus, the first element of the court’s 
analysis, that Brawley had a serious medical need, had been clearly 
satisfied.70 
 In examining whether Brawley’s right to be free from 
restraints during labor was an established constitutional right, the 
court found that “by April of 2007 shackling inmates while they are 
in labor was clearly established as a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”71 
That is, by the time Brawley experienced this treatment, her right to 
be free from such degrading practices had been clearly established 
and was protected by the Constitution.72 Despite this, Brawley, like 
others both before and after her, was forced to endure this violation 
of her basic human rights. 
 
iv. Villegas 
 
 Juana Villegas was nine months pregnant when she was 
arrested for driving without a driver’s license and then detained 
                                               
62 Id. at 1213-1214. 
63 Id. at 1214. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1219. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1220. 
71 Id. at 1221. 
72 Id. (citing Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 533 (8th Cir. 2009)).  
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when it was found that she did not have adequate immigration 
documentation.73 Just two days after being booked into the jail, 
Villegas went into labor.74 She was transported to the hospital in 
handcuffs and leg restraints.75 Upon arrival at the hospital, her 
handcuffs were taken off, but one of Villegas’ legs was shackled to 
her hospital bed.76 One of the nurses told the officer that Villegas 
should not be restrained, but the officer ignored her.77 Villegas was 
un-shackled and re-shackled at multiple points throughout both 
labor and postpartum recovery.78 
 The court, like others, evaluated Villegas’ case using a 
combination of conditions of confinement and serious medical 
needs analyses.79 The court found both that shackling posed a risk 
of harm to Villegas and that “the shackling of pregnant detainees 
while in labor offends contemporary standards of human decency 
such that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’…”80 Thus, 
Villegas’ right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment had 
been violated. However, the court held that “…the right to be free 
from shackling during labor is not unqualified.”81 In so finding, the 
court listed two exceptions: (1) restraints may be used if the inmate 
posed a flight risk; and (2) restraints may be used if the inmate poses 
a substantial risk of harm to herself or others. 82 
 
B. State Legislation 
 
 Thus far, only 22 states and the District of Columbia have 
adopted legislation banning the practice of shackling pregnant 
inmates.83 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology has 
listed six areas which it suggests states address in enacting this type 
of legislation.84 These are:  
 
1. Broadly restrict restraints during labor, 
delivery, postpartum and transport to a 
medical facility; 
2. Allow medical personnel to have restraints 
                                               
73 Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2013). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 567. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 571. 
80 Id. at 574. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 See supra note 7. 
84 Id. 
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removed immediately; 
3. Require written documentation by 
corrections personnel of the use of restraints; 
4. Apply to juveniles; 
5. Require corrections personnel to remain 
outside delivery room for privacy concerns; 
and 
6. Address additional health concerns of 
pregnant inmates (including adequate 
prenatal care, appropriate maternal nutrition 
and nutrition counseling, HIV and substance 
screening and treatment).85 
Each state with legislation limiting the use of restraints has 
addressed the first category in its coverage.86 However, fewer states 
cover fewer categories as the list continues.87 
 In 2010, The Rebecca Project for Human Rights and the 
National Women’s Law Center partnered to create a state-by-state 
report card reviewing several aspects of reproductive care provided 
to incarcerated women.88 One of the areas reviewed was the use of 
restraints during pregnancy. At the time of the report, only ten states 
had adopted laws addressing shackling.89 The report found that 
thirty-six states had failed to “comprehensively limit, or limit at all, 
the use of restraints on pregnant women during transportation, labor 
and delivery and postpartum recuperation.”90 Of the states lacking 
any statute dealing with the practice of shackling, “[t]wenty-two 
states either have no policy at all addressing when restraints can be 
used on pregnant women or have a policy which allows for the use 
of dangerous leg irons or waist chains.”91 Equally as shocking, 
“eleven states either allow any officer to make the determination [to 
use restraints for security reasons] or do not have a policy on who 
determines whether the woman is a security risk.”92 Perhaps most 
unsettling of all, “[t]hirty-four states do not require each incident of 
                                               
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Mothers Behind Bars: A state-by-state report card and analysis of federal 
policies on conditions of confinement for pregnant and parenting women and 
the effect on their children, Nat’l Women’s L. Center (Oct. 2010), 
https://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/mothersbehindbars2010.pdf. 
89 Id. at 6. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 7. 
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the use of restraints to be reported or reviewed by an independent 
body.”93 
 One aspect of policies against restraining pregnant women 
that seems to be shared by the courts, by advocates of anti-shackling 
legislation, and by the states, is the inclusion of exceptions to a 
prohibition of the practice.94 In general, these exceptions are: (1) 
restraints may be used if the woman poses a significant risk of harm 
to herself or others; and (2) restraints may be used if the woman 
poses a flight risk. For example, New Mexico’s statute regarding 
shackling pregnant inmates states: 
 
“A.  An adult or juvenile correctional facility, 
detention center or local jail shall use the least 
restrictive restraints necessary when the facility has 
actual or constructive knowledge that an inmate is 
in the second or third trimester of pregnancy. No 
restraints of any kind shall be used on an inmate 
who is in labor, delivering her baby or recuperating 
from the delivery unless there are compelling 
grounds to believe that the inmate presents: 
(1) an immediate and serious threat of harm to 
herself, staff or others; or 
(2) a substantial flight risk and cannot be 
reasonably contained by other means. 
B.  If an inmate who is in labor or who is delivering 
her baby is restrained, only the least restrictive 
restraints necessary to ensure safety and security 
shall be used.”95 
Thus, states consider exceptions to a blanket prohibition on the use 
                                               
93 Id. 
94 See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 533; Villegas, 709 F.3d at 574; G.A. Res. 70/175, 
annex, at 48(2), Nelson Mandela Rules, (Dec. 17, 2015); Health Care for 
Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, 
Comm. Op. No. 511, at 4, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS 
(2011), https://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/Health-Care-for-
Pregnant-and-Postpartum-Incarcerated-Women-and-Adolescent-Females; An 
“Act to prohibit the shackling of pregnant prisoners” model state legislation, 
AM. MEDICAL ASSOC. (2015), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/specialty%20group/arc/shackling-
pregnant-prisoners-issue-brief.pdf; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-4.2 (West); Tex. 
Gov’t Code Ann. § 501.066 (West); Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 361.082 
(West); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 801a (West); N.Y. Correct. Law § 611 
(McKinney); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17-1-113.7 (West 2006); Wash. Rev. Code 
Ann. § 72.09.651 (West). 
95 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-14.2 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 
Second Regular Session of the 53rd Legislature). 
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of restraints to be imperative to the success of implementation of 
this type of legislation. 
 
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
 
i. Federal Bureau of Prisons 
 
 In 2008, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“FBOP”) instituted 
policy against shackling pregnant inmates.96 However, the FBOP 
only exclusively banned the use of belly chains.97 With regard to 
such other restraints as handcuffs and leg shackles, the FBOP left 
the decision to the discretion of prison officials.98 This discretion is 
not unqualified, however, and restraints are generally not considered 
necessary unless the inmate poses a significant risk of harm or a risk 
of escape.99 These exceptions are analogous to those in state 
legislation discussed above. 
 
ii. Congress 
 
On July 11, 2017, the Dignity for Incarcerated Women Act 
(the “Dignity Act”) was introduced in the Senate and referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary.100 Sponsored by Senator Cory Booker, 
along with Senators Elizabeth Warren, Richard Durbin, and Kamala 
Harris, the bill would mandate significant changes in multiple areas 
concerning health care and basic rights for incarcerated women.101 
In particular, it calls for a complete ban on the use of restraints on 
pregnant women:  
 “A Federal penal or correctional institution may not 
use instruments of restraint, including handcuffs, 
chains, iron, straitjackets, or similar items, on a 
prisoner who is pregnant.”102 
Thus, the bill includes none of the exceptions that most state 
statutes, court opinions, and model bills do, nor does it provide for 
detainees. Although admirable in its attempt to institute a complete 
ban on the use of restraints on pregnant federal inmates, the bill is 
unlikely to pass without at least some exceptions to the blanket rule. 
The perception that inmates may be dangerous and may attempt 
                                               
96 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: ESCORTED 
TRIPS, NO. 5538.05, at 11(a) (Oct. 6, 2008), 
http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5538_07.pdf. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at § 570.44. 
99 Id. 
100 See supra note 1. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at § 4050(d)(2). 
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escape if left unrestrained is too pervasive for a complete ban to pass 
a bipartisan Congress. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Leading health and civil rights organizations, as well as 
the United Nations, oppose shackling pregnant inmates. 
 The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(“ACOG”), one of the leading voices against the use of restraints on 
pregnant incarcerated women, has listed multiple ways in which the 
imposition of restraints might harm both the mother and her child.103 
The complete ACOG table listing some of the various potential 
consequences associated with shackling is reproduced on the last 
page of this Note and includes such medical risks as: heightened risk 
of falling and lessened ability to break a fall; hindered ability of 
medical professionals to examine the woman in labor; increased risk 
of injury if the mother suffers from seizures brought on by 
preeclampsia; decreased ability to move around in order to alleviate 
pain; and hindered ability of medical professionals to prepare the 
woman for emergency situations such as a cesarean delivery.104 
 The ACOG has acknowledged that the FBOP, US Marshals 
Service, and other organizations have established policies against 
shackling, but “[t]hese standards serve as guidelines and are 
voluntary, not mandatory. State and local prisons are not required to 
abide by either the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy or the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care standards…”105 Without 
mandatory requirements for jails and their staff, the basic rights of 
American women will continue to be infringed upon. 
 The American Medical Association (“AMA”) has also lent 
its voice to those speaking against the use of restraints during 
pregnancy. The AMA’s Advocacy Resource Center formulated a 
report on the use of shackles on pregnant inmates in 2015, finding 
no justified reason to continue the custom.106 Not only did the AMA 
point out that “[t]he vast majority of female prisoners or detainees 
are … non-violent offenders,” it also found that “[w]hile states 
                                               
103 Health Care for Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and 
Adolescent Females, Comm. Op. No. 511, at 3-4, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS (2011), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-
Women/co511.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20180628T1710410017  
104 Id. at 3. 
105 Id.  
106 An “Act to prohibit the shackling of pregnant prisoners” model state 
legislation, at 1, AM. MEDICAL ASSOC. (2015), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/specialty%20group/arc/shackling-
pregnant-prisoners-issue-brief.pdf. 
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justify using restraints to prevent escapes, no women in labor have 
ever attempted escape.”107 At its 2010 Annual Meeting, the AMA 
“adopted policy condemning the practice of shackling pregnant 
prisoners” and recommended the AMA formulate a model bill.108 In 
so doing, the AMA expressed approval of New Mexico’s anti-
shackling statute (reproduced above).109 In its model legislation, the 
AMA provided for the very same exceptions that most states and 
courts have encouraged – significant risk of harm and risk of escape 
– and considers these to be rare occasions.110 However, “[t]he AMA 
model state legislation extends the shackling prohibition to the 
second and third trimester due to safety risks shackling poses to 
pregnant women…”111 Thus, the AMA model legislation is slightly 
more comprehensive than those employed by most states. 
 The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) has also 
worked to end the practice of restraining pregnant inmates and 
detainees. According to the ACLU, the risk of adverse consequences 
of shackling a pregnant mother are unacceptable both to the 
pregnant woman and to her child.112 In its own words, “Shackling 
pregnant women is dangerous and inhumane. Although widely 
regarded as an assault on human dignity as well as an unsafe medical 
practice, women prisoners are still routinely shackled during 
pregnancy and childbirth.”113 The ACLU does not take this issue 
lightly, as evidenced by their representation of Shawanna Nelson in 
her fight for justice.114 Like the AMA, the ACLU reported that not 
one state with a policy or statute against the use of shackles had 
“reported any escapes or threats to medical or correctional staff from 
pregnant prisoners since prohibiting shackling.”115 Further, the 
ACLU categorizes the practice as “degrading, unnecessary, and a 
violation of human rights.”116 
 Perhaps most persuasive, the United Nations itself has 
adopted anti-shackling rules in its Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners, which were renamed as the Nelson Mandela 
Rules in December 2015.117 The rule states: “Instruments of restraint 
                                               
107 Id. at 3. 
108 Id. at 1. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 4. 
111 Id. at 2. 
112 ACLU Briefing Paper: The Shackling of Pregnant Women & Girls in U.S. 
Prisons, Jails & Youth Detention Centers, at 1, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
(OCT. 10, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/anti-
shackling_briefing_paper_stand_alone.pdf.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 3. 
115 Id. at 5. 
116 Id. at 1. 
117 See G.A. Res. 70/175, annex, Nelson Mandela Rules, (Dec. 17, 2015); U.N. 
Office on Drugs and Crime, The Nelson Mandela Rules, an updated Guide for 
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shall never be used on women during labour, during childbirth and 
immediately after childbirth.”118 The United States of America is a 
member of the United Nations, and as a member, is charged with an 
obligation to “promote solutions of international economic, social, 
health, and related problems” (emphasis added).119 These standard 
rules formulated by the UN were considered by that body to be 
necessary in order to advise Member States on “good principles and 
practice in the treatment of prisoners and prison management.”120 
However, the United States clearly has not taken this crucial portion 
of the Nelson Mandela Rules seriously. America cannot truly be 
considered a protector of human rights unless and until it 
implements such standard minimum rules outlined by the Nelson 
Mandela Rules for the treatment of pregnant female inmates and 
detainees. 
 
B. Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al. 
 
 In 2013, Shonda Martin was pregnant and became 
incarcerated in the Milwaukee County Jail.121 Martin was subjected 
to horrific sexual assault during this time by Officer Thicklen, one 
of the employees at the jail.122 Not only did he assault her while she 
was pregnant, he immediately resumed his attacks after she 
delivered her baby.123 
 As if not enough for Martin to be subjected to abuse by 
Officer Thicklen, Martin was also shackled by one wrist and one leg 
restraint throughout labor.124 Only the leg restraint was removed 
while Martin delivered her child.125 Martin’s case was tried by a jury 
in July of 2017. As to her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
claims for the sexual assault committed against her by Officer 
Thicklen, the jury awarded her $6.7 million.126 However, as to her 
shackling claim, the jury awarded her nothing.127 
 Martin’s failure to exact justice on her shackling claim stems 
from the tactics employed by her counsel. In her original complaint, 
                                               
Prison Management in line with Human Rights, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/GA-
RESOLUTION/E_ebook.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).  
118 G.A. Res. 70/175, annex, at 48(2), Nelson Mandela Rules, (Dec. 17, 2015). 
119 U.N. Charter art. 55, ¶ 1(b). 
120 See G.A. Res. 70/175, supra note 106, Preliminary observation 1. 
121 First Amended Complaint at 3, Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., No. 
2:14-cv-00200 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 
122 Id. at 3-8. 
123 Id. at 6-7. 
124 Id. at 10. 
125 Id. 
126 Amended Judgment at 1, Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., No. 2:14-cv-
00200 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 
127 Id. at 2. 
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Martin categorized the use of restraints during her pregnancy as an 
Eighth Amendment violation.128 However, in her amended 
complaint, Martin categorized her claim as a Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process violation.129 The flaw lies here. Because 
she relied on the Fourteenth Amendment for this claim, the test 
employed by the court was different. Whereas an Eighth 
Amendment claim requires a complainant to demonstrate that an 
official was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, 
Martin’s Fourteenth Amendment claim required her to demonstrate 
that the jail had a policy that was not reasonably calculated to 
achieve a legitimate goal, and as a result of this policy, Martin 
suffered harm.130 Although the jury did find that the use of shackles 
was not reasonably calculated to achieve a legitimate purpose, it also 
determined that Martin had not suffered any harm.131 This is 
arguable in itself, as Martin most likely did suffer some extent of 
mental and emotional harm as a result of being shackled throughout 
labor, delivery, and postpartum recovery. However, considering the 
practically identical facts between Martin and the cases discussed 
previously – Women Prisoners, Nelson, Brawley, and Villegas – 
Martin almost assuredly would have prevailed if she had brought the 
proper Eighth Amendment claim. The error here lies with the 
choices made by her counsel.  
 It is important to note that shackling is an Eighth 
Amendment violation, and that a jury specifically found it did not 
breach Martin’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.132 Had 
pregnant inmates’ right to be free from shackling been established 
as a principle protected by Due Process, it would have automatically 
been recognized across the country.133 No state would be able to 
infringe upon this basic right of female prisoners.134 However, 
because it was not a Fourteenth Amendment right under substantive 
due process, it is necessary for the federal government to enact 
legislation to keep shackling from being used against pregnant 
female prisoners and detainees in federal prisons. Additionally, it is 
necessary for states to enact prohibitory legislation in order to 
protect state and local inmates. 
 Despite Martin’s loss with regard to the unconstitutional use 
                                               
128 Complaint at 10, Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., No. 2:14-cv-00200 
(E.D. Wis. 2014). 
129 First Amended Complaint at 10-11, Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., 
No. 2:14-cv-00200 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 
130 Jury Instructions at 17, Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., No. 2:14-cv-
00200 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 
131 Amended Judgment at 2, Martin v. County of Milwaukee, et al., No. 2:14-cv-
00200 (E.D. Wis. 2014). 
132 Id. 
133 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015). 
134 See id. 
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of shackling during her pregnancy, this case is important to 
demonstrate that this problem is tangible and continually existent in 
the United States. Martin’s case is analogous to those which came 
before, proving that the policy and practice is widespread. Without 
legislation to prevent this practice from occurring, the basic human 
rights of these already underprivileged women will continue to be 
infringed. As a result, not only will the health of the mother be 
endangered, but the health and life of her unborn child. 
 
IV. ARGUMENT 
 
 An examination of the cases involving shackling claims of 
pregnant inmates and detainees might suggest that it is agreed and 
established that shackling is wrong.135 From that conclusion, one 
could naturally assume that because it is an established 
constitutional violation, the federal and state governments would 
take steps to prevent similar instances from occurring. However, 
only 22 states have implemented legislation protecting female 
prisoners from this practice.136 Senator Cory Booker, one of the 
proponents of the Dignity for Incarcerated Women Act, blames this 
absence of action on a lack of discourse surrounding the practice.137 
This lack of dialogue must be remedied, because in reality, the facts 
are these: 
 
• 60% of women in state prisons were previously victims of 
abuse.138 
• The overwhelming majority of women arrested are taken 
into custody for non-violent offenses. In fact, violent offense 
arrests constituted only 17% of women arrested in 1998.139 
• Overall, women account for only about 14% of violent 
offenders. Men count for almost 6 times this number.140 
• Of female violent offenders, 75% committed mere simple 
                                               
135 See cases cited supra note 5. 
136 See supra note 7. 
137 Senators Booker, Warren, Durbin, Harris Introduce Landmark Bill to Reform 
the Way Women Are Treated Behind Bars, ELIZABETH WARREN: U.S. SENATOR 
FOR MASS. (July 11, 2017), https://www.warren.senate.gov 
/?p=press_release&id=1727. 
138 Lawrence A. Greenfield & Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Women Offenders at 1 (1999), available at 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/wo.pdf.  
139 Id. at 5. 
140 Id. at 1. 
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assault.141 
• Approximately 950,000 women were involved with the 
criminal justice system in 1998. In other words, 1 out of 
every 109 adult American women.142 
• An estimated 6% of women committed to local jails were 
pregnant at the time, and an estimated 5% of women 
committed to state prisons were pregnant when admitted. 143 
• Approximately 3% of women in local jails received prenatal 
care once admitted, compared to about 4% of women in state 
prisons.144 
 The number of women in the criminal justice system 
continues to increase.145 The vast majority of these women are non-
violent offenders.146 In addition, a majority have been past victims 
of physical or sexual abuse.147 Our criminal justice system receives 
these women, commits them to confinement, and then shackles them 
to their wheelchairs and hospital beds while they give birth to their 
children, as if they were no better than animals. This method of 
punishment – cruel and unusual punishment to be precise – shows 
them that not only were they worthless in the minds of those who 
abused them, but they are also worthless in the eyes of the criminal 
justice system, those employed by the criminal justice system, and 
the greater American people. 
 Although it might at first seem like common sense to allow 
a woman to be free from restraint during such a critical time as labor, 
delivery, and postpartum recovery, the preceding cases demonstrate 
that this is not the truth. In order to protect the rights of these women, 
who themselves may not be able to adequately defend their cause, 
we must ensure that this practice is banned, and that those who 
breach this ban will be liable for the human rights violation they 
have committed. The incarcerated women who suffer these 
instances of punishment are themselves serving time in order to 
establish justice for their wrongs. It is only fitting and in conformity 
with American principles of justice that those who commit offenses 
against these women are also held liable for their actions. 
                                               
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 8. 
144 Id. 
145 Aleks Kajstura & Russ Immarigeon, States of Women’s Incarceration: The 
Global Context, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/women/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2018). 
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 Further, as explained by the ACOG, the policies 
implemented by the FBOP, US Marshals Service, and similar 
institutions are insufficient to guard women in either federal prisons 
or in state prisons.148 This is because they are not mandatory 
standards, but merely suggest appropriate conduct.149 In order to 
protect female inmates and detainees from the use of shackles 
throughout the course of pregnancy, mandatory provisions, i.e., state 
and federal legislation, must be put in place to more effectively 
regulate the conduct of those overseeing these women.150  
 However, as the courts and others have found, the right to be 
free from restraint is not and should not be unqualified. This Note 
recognizes that there are certain rare but necessary circumstances in 
which restraints might be used, and recommends that all states and 
the federal government enact legislation banning the practice of 
shackling pregnant inmates similar to that employed by New 
Mexico.151 Yet, a few necessary changes should be made to this 
statute. 
 First, the “compelling grounds” on which an inmate might 
be subjected to the use of restraints should be defined. Such 
definition should include a non-exhaustive but exemplary list of the 
unusual circumstances that might justify the use of restraints. In 
addition, if one of those compelling grounds is found by a prison 
official, the official should seek the agreement of at least two other 
prison officials as to whether or not restraints should be utilized. 
Further, any use of restraints as a result of one of the compelling 
grounds should be documented in a report submitted by the official, 
and signed by the two officials who agreed restraints should be 
utilized. 
 Second, section (B), which allows for the least restrictive 
restraints necessary if a pregnant inmate or detainee is shackled, 
should be amended to prohibit all use of restraint during delivery of 
the child. The potential health risks and the woman’s interest in 
being free from restraints during the intense stress of childbirth are 
such that restraints should never be used during this time. 
 Third, the statute should expressly provide for the liability of 
those who breach a woman’s constitutional right to be free from 
restraint during pregnancy. An inmate’s right to be free from the use 
                                               
148 Health Care for Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and 
Adolescent Females, Comm. Op. No. 511, at 4, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & 
GYNECOLOGISTS (2011), available at https://www.acog.org/Resources-And-
Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-
Women/Health-Care-for-Pregnant-and-Postpartum-Incarcerated-Women-and-
Adolescent-Females. 
149 Id. 
150 See id. 
151 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-1-4.2 (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 
Second Regular Session of the 53rd Legislature). 
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of restraints and therefore from cruel and unusual punishment 
should not be taken lightly. It is necessary to notify those that might 
engage in restraining a pregnant inmate that they could potentially 
face liability for their actions in order to ensure the end of this 
practice.  
 In formulating anti-shackling legislation, it is recommended 
that legislators examine the American Medical Association’s model 
bill titled “An Act to Prohibit the Shackling of Pregnant 
Prisoners.”152 The model bill provides: 
 
“Section 4. Requirements. Restraint of Prisoners 
and Detainees 
(a) An adult or juvenile correctional institution 
shall use the least restrictive restraints 
necessary when the correctional institution 
has actual or constructive knowledge that a 
prisoner or detainee is in the second or third 
trimester of pregnancy. No restraints of any 
kind shall be used on a prisoner or detainee 
during labor, transport to a medical facility, 
delivery, and postpartum recovery unless 
there are compelling grounds to believe that 
the prisoner or detainee presents: 
(1)  an immediate and serious threat of harm 
to herself, staff or others; or 
(2) a substantial flight risk and cannot be 
reasonably contained by other means. 
(b) Under no circumstances shall leg or waist 
restraints be used on any prisoner or detainee 
who is in labor or delivery. 
(c) If restraints are used on a prisoner or detainee 
pursuant to subsection (a), the corrections 
official shall make written findings within ten 
(10) days as to the extraordinary circumstance 
that dictated the use of the restraints to ensure 
the safety and security of the prisoner or 
detainee, the staff of the correctional 
institution or medical facility, other prisoners 
or detainees, or the public. These findings 
shall be kept on file for at least five (5) years 
                                               
152 An Act to Prohibit the Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners, AM. MED. ASSOC.: 
ADVOCACY RESOURCE CENTER (Oct. 2010), https://www.ama-
assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/specialty%20group/arc/shackling-
pregnant-prisoners-model-bill.pdf. 
 AMERICA: LAND OF THE SHACKLED VOL. II 
 
21 
and be made available for public inspection, 
except that no information identifying any 
prisoner or detainees shall be made public in 
violation of [insert relevant section] without 
the prisoner or detainee’s prior written 
consent. 
Section 5. Enforcement. Notice to Prisoners and 
Detainees 
(a) Within 30 days of the effectiveness of this Act, 
all correctional institutions in [State] shall 
develop rules pursuant to this Act. 
(b) Correctional institutions shall inform 
prisoners and detainees of the rules developed 
pursuant to subsection (a) upon admission to 
the correctional institution and … post 
policies or practices pursuant to this Act in 
locations in the correctional institution where 
such notices are commonly posted, including 
common housing areas and medical care 
facilities. 
(c) Within 60 days of the effectiveness of this Act, 
correctional institutions shall inform prisoners 
and detainees within the custody of the 
correctional institution of the rules developed 
pursuant to subsection (a).”153 
 The AMA’s model bill provides for many of the suggestions 
made by this Note. However, the language of the model bill should 
be altered to provide for those recommendations not included by the 
AMA. For example, “compelling grounds” should be defined in the 
definitions section of the statute. The definition should include a 
non-exhaustive but exemplary list of the rare circumstances which 
might allow for the use of restraints. Also, section (b) of the bill 
should be amended so that leg or waist restraints may not be used at 
any time during a woman’s pregnancy. Nonetheless, taken as a 
whole, the AMA’s model bill is a good example of model legislation 
for states and the federal government to consider when enacting 
anti-shackling statutes. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Although it presents itself as the “land of the free,” 
America’s reputation does suffer from more than one example of 
human rights abuse. One such abuse is the use of restraints on 
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pregnant inmates and detainees. This practice has been denounced 
by the United Nations, by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, by multiple 
United States courts, and by multiple states.154 However, as 
evidenced by Martin v. County of Milwaukee, the practice still 
persists. In order to end this violation of the Eighth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States and protect the rights of these 
already underprivileged women, it is necessary for both the federal 
government and individual state governments to enact legislation 
banning the practice. Not only must the practice be banned, anti-
shackling legislation must provide for the liability of those who 
breach a woman’s right to be free from restraint during pregnancy, 
labor, delivery, and postpartum recovery.  America cannot attempt 
to establish principles of freedom and justice throughout the rest of 
the world if those same principles are not recognized and protected 
at home. 
 
                                               
154 See G.A. Res. 70/175, annex, at 48(2), Nelson Mandela Rules, (Dec. 17, 
2015); FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT: 
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522 (8th Cir. 2009); Brawley v. Washington, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (W.D. Wash. 
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155 See supra note 148. 
Box 2. Examples of the Health Effects of Restraints
Nausea and vomiting are common symptoms of early pregnancy. Adding the discomfort of 
shackles to a woman already suffering is cruel and inhumane.
It is important for women to have the ability to break their falls. Shackling increases the risk of 
falls and decreases the woman’s ability to protect herself and the fetus if she does fall.
If a woman has abdominal pain during pregnancy, a number of tests to evaluate for conditions 
such as appendicitis, preterm labor, or kidney infection may not be performed while a woman is 
shackled.
Prompt and uninhibited assessment for vaginal bleeding during pregnancy is important. Shackling 
can delay diagnosis, which may pose a threat to the health of the woman or the fetus.
Hypertensive disease occurs in approximately 12-22% of pregnancies, and is directly responsible 
for 17.6% of maternal deaths in the United States. Preeclampsia can result in seizures, which may 
not be safely treated in a shackled patient.
Women are at increased risk of venous thrombosis during pregnancy and the postpartum period. 
Limited mobility caused by shackling may increase this risk and may compromise the health of the 
woman and the fetus.
Shackling interferes with normal labor and delivery:
•The ability to ambulate during labor increases the likelihood for adequate pain management, 
successful cervical dilation, and a successful vaginal delivery.
•Women need to be able to move or be moved in preparation for emergencies for labor and 
delivery, including should dystocia, hemorrhage, or abnormalities of the fetal heart rate 
requiring intervention, including urgent cesarean delivery.
After delivery, a healthy baby should remain with the mother to facilitate mother-child bonding. 
Shackles may prevent or inhibit this bonding and interfere with the mother’s safe handling of her 
infant.
As the infant grows, mothers should be part of the child's care (ie, take the baby to child wellness 
visits and immunizations) to enhance their bond. Shackling while attending to the child's health 
care needs may interfere with her ability to be involved in these activities.
